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THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
A "PRUDENT INVESTMENT" RATE BASE
By JOHN BAUERt
CONJURED up by the Supreme Court in Sinyth v. Ames' and incanted
through a series of decisions during the nineteen-twenties the concept of
"fair value" and its requirements long bedevilled the determination of
"return" on investment as a factor in public utility rate-making. After a
long struggle, this troublesome spirit has finally been driven out by the
reconstituted Court in the recent case of Federal PoZw'er Compnission v.
Hope Aatural Gas Conpany.2 Ruling that commissions in fixing rates are
not bound by any one particular formula and that cottrt; may on review con-
sider only the reasonableness of the end result, the Court cleared the way
for the adoption of a rate-making base more satisfactory than "fair
value." It is the main purpose of this article to present a definite program
by which a "prudent investment" rate base can be established and syste-
matically administered. First, however, the development and demise of
"fair value" will be briefly considered.
"FAIR VALUE"
In fixing reasonable utility rates agencies must naturally make provi-
sion to cover all the costs that are properly incurred in furnishing public
service. The four major cost factors are: (1) ordinary operating ex-
penses and maintenance,' (2) depreciation as it takes place currently,4
* Director, The American Public Utilities Bureau.
1. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
2. 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
3. Operating expenses for any accounting period include the current c, 'st of la ir
and materials used in operating the properties and making ordinary repairs aud the cost
of minor replacements of properties used in operation. Amounts included for rate-mahing
are the actual and reasonable costs. Extravagant or otherwise unwarranted costs are
excluded. The proper amounts are usually taken directly from accounts and involve little
or no factual dispute.
4. Depreciation provides for that physical and functional decline uf major pr p2rtv
units which is not made good by the ordinary repairs and the minur replacements included
in operating expenses. Current charges or allowances fur depreciation are ordinarily
classed along with operating expenses. Provisions for depreciation are predicated upon
the original cost of the property and its present age in relation to total service life. While
they are thus based on original plant costs, they involve efimates as to, tutal service life
(also as to particular mode of regular calculation). Xo serious difficulties have baen
encountered, however, in regulatory determinations. Companies have usually agreed that
full current depreciation, functional as well as physical, should he included in the fixing
of rates. In the determination of the rate base, however, they have generally attempted t
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
(3) taxes payable in connection with operation at reasonable rates,5 and
(4) return on the properties used in operation. The first three of these
factors are moderately definite in content and determination and have
caused relatively little difficulty in past rate-making practice. In principle
they consist of actual cost reasonably incurred in connection with efficient
and economical operation and can for the most part be determined from
the utility's accounts and records. The fourth factor, however, has caused
considerable trouble partly because of unclear concepts and uncertain
facts, but chiefly because of requirements imposed by the Supreme Court,
which, in turn, were probably based largely upon past factual uncertain-
ties.
Determination of ' return on properties involves two underlying ele-
ments: the valuation or rate base and the rate of return by which the rate
base is multiplied. While the rate of return is quantitatively as important
as the rate base, it has evoked less theoretical dispute, and its practical
ascertainment has caused considerably less difficulty. On the cost prin-
ciple, it should be the actual rate of return reasonably paid in obtaining
needed capital for public service; but it has also involved conjectural ele-
ments of cost at the time of the rate inquiry. In the interest of definite
regulation, it should be shifted to actual cost along with the rate base.
But since the rate base has been the chief hindrance to effective rate con-
trol, this discussion will be limited to that factor.
Determination of the rate base in any particular case has always in-
volved the questions of what elements to include, at what amounts, and
in what proportions. It has raised especially the problem of how far valu-
ation should be based on the original cost of the properties and to what
extent provision should be made for replacement, or "reproduction cost,"
at the time of the rate inquiry. Instead of permitting the computation of
return on the direct basis of cost properly incurred, as is the practice in
determining operating expenses, depreciation, and taxes, the Supreme
confine deductions from the "cost new" of the properties to either "observed" or "physical"
depreciation and have disregarded entirely the functional causes of depreciation. See page
508 et seg. infra.
5. In the past the tax factor has caused little dispute. It included actual taxes paid
in connection with the furnishing of service. Companies have been regarded merely as
tax-collecting agencies, the amounts being actually payable by consumers, There has
always been some doubt, however, as to the validity of including in the rate coverage, pay-
ments of federal income tax (or any income tax), especially amounts based on excessive
income above a "fair return." This feature has come particularly into prominence during
the war, since the regular 1943 federal income tax has reached forty per cent on taxable
income, roughly up to six per cent on invested capital, and ninety per cent on the balance
subject to excess profits tax. The author submits first, that at most the regular income
tax of forty per cent (or whatever modification may be made) should be predicated upon
otherwise reasonable rates and. secondly, that in any case, no excess profits taxes should
be allowed as a cost for rate-making purposes. See Bauer, Relatioli of the War Taxes to
Utility Rate Making (1944) 33 P. U. FORT. 211.
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Court held in Smyth z. Ames ' that return must be predicated upon the
"fair value" of the properties used for the convenience of the public and
that
in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of con-
struction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as com-
pared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning
capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute,
and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and
right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other mat-
ters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property. What the
company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which
it employs for the public convenience. On the other hand, what the
public is entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it .. .
than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth." 7
Manifestly, this purported prescription of "fair value" for rate-making
presented neither a clear concept, nor a definite basis for factual deter-
mination. What it meant has been widely discussed and disputed.
The issue of what "fair value" is became predominant in rate cases dur-
ing and immediately following the first World War. After the McCar-
die 8 and the St. Louis-O'Fallon ' cases, reproduction cost appeared legally
fixed as the dominant element to be considered in determining "fair
value." It is primarily this requirement which has greatly complicated
rate-making procedure and extensively frustrated rate control."0
6. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
7. Id. at 546-47.
S. 11cCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
9. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929).
10. The first two in the series of leading cases which appeared to fix the "fair value-
reproduction cost" rate base were decided prior to the first World War. Willcox v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 (1909); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913).
In each of these cases the opinion stressed that return should be based upon the "fair
value" of the properties at the time of their use for the benefit of the public. While re-
production cost was in neither case a decisive factor in the decision, the period was one
during which current costs of construction had not greatly surpassed (if at all) the actual
installation costs of the properties. The postwar cases, however, were decided in a p.riod
when current construction costs stood generally far above original costs. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276 (1923); Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Comm., 262 U. S. 679 (1923); McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926) ; St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States,
279 U. S. 461 (1929). Therefore, the required inclusion of reproduction cost had a sub-
stantial effect on valuation figures.
Despite these cases, certain of the Supreme Court Justices continued to e.x'pound the
view that "actual cost" constituted the primary factor in determining "fair value." While
reproduction cost was given emphasis in the majority opinion in the Souhiwrestcni Bell
1941
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Considerable dispute and uncertainty has also been caused by a second
phase of the "fair value" determination, the problem of determining the
amount of property depreciation since original construction deductible
from the "cost new" (whether actual cost, reproduction cost, or any other
particular combination). Although this deduction was not even men-
tioned in Smyth v. Aines, it was necessarily a part of the determination
of "fair value." It was first comprehensively considered by the Supreme
Court in 1909," but the concept itself and the ascertainment of depre-
ciation in any case have remained subject to dispute and have contributed
seriously to the difficulties attached to the computation of the "fair value"
rate base.
Reproduction Cost Obstructions. The objection to the "fair value" rate
base has been premised partially on indefiniteness of concept, but mostly
on difficulties of application and administration, especially in regard to
reproduction cost. From the strictly legal standpoint there has never been
clear recognition that the "fair value" concept differs basically from ordi-
nary commercial value or, particularly, from valte as found in condem-
nation cases, where distinctly private property is taken for public use.
Commercial or condemnation value depends directly or indirectly upon
earning power; but since this depends, in turn, upon the prices charged
for the product, such value cannot be used as the basis of rate-making."
case, supra, Mr. Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion presented "prudent invest-
ment" as the reasonable rate base determinant. Only three weeks after the Southwestern
Bell decision, moreover, Mr. Justice Brandeis read the majority opinion in Georgia Ry.
& Power Co. v. Railroad Comm., 262 U. S. 625 (1923), where the rate base included no
provision for reproduction cost. Although following this case, the Court returned to the
reproduction cost requirement, Messrs. Justices Brandeis and Holmes continued to dis-
sent.
The first indications of success in the battle for a prudent investment rate base came
after the 1929 financial collapse with the resultant break in the general price level. Despite
the fact that in Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U. S. 287 (1933),
Chief Justice Hughes stated that the decision was based on general principles which the
Court had often proclaimed, the rates approved were predicated on a rate base in which no
provision was made for reproduction cost. In West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co., 295 U. S. 662 (1935), the Court rejected a price-index method of adjusting prior
valuation figures to the current costs at the time of the rate inquiry. This rejection of a
particular method of attaining "fair value" did not, however, bear directly on the repro-
duction cost requirement. But in Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U. S. 575 (1942), it appeared that the Court had abandoned reproduction cost,
approving a prudent investment rate base. The conclusive statement of this abandonment
was made in the case under consideration here. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). Now no rate base is essential to the fixing of reasonable
rates; only the end results are decisive as to whether actual injustice has been perpetrated.
11. City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (1909).
12. See, e.g., Hale, Does the Ghost of Smnvth v. Ames Still Walk? (1942) 55 HArr.
L. Ray. 1116. The Supreme Court itself has, until recently, virtually ignored any basic
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The inherent illogic of basing rates on a value that depends on rates, a
process of theoretical self-blocking, has in practice been obviated by pri-
mary recourse to reproduction cost and other factors that do not depend
on rates.
In the past a typical rate case started with a reproduction cost appraisal
and a depreciation study. So-called "physical value" consisted of repro-
duction cost less depreciation. To this was added an allowance for "going
concern" value and a further amount for working capital. Not a single
step in the entire determination could be taken from exact records. Each
depended, to a varying extent, on estimates, opinions, and hypothetical
calculations beyond the scope of precise measurement and exact factual
verification.
Determination of reproduction cost started with an inventory or physi-
cal count of the various classes of property used in operation. While to
a large extent the quantities could be ascertained from records, they were
subject to field counts and measurements. When completed, the inven-
tory presented a classification of property units and the number of units
in each class. The job of making a complete inventory was often extreme-
ly laborious and costly. The second stepwas to prepare "unit prices" for
each class of property as presented in the inventory. Each unit price was
then applied to the number of units, giving the reproduction cost of each
difference in the kind of "value" encountered for different purposes. It has spAJen (if
"fair value" as if it were identical with ordinary commercial or condemnation value, or
with the value of a "going concern." In some opinions the assumption has been implicit
that the properties were in effect taken in condemnation at the time of the rate inquiry.
This view ignores the fact that the rates are subject to public restriction because the prop-
erties have continuously been dedicated to public service and have, therefore, been clthed
with public interest from the time private capital was invested in the quasi-public enter-
prise. Since the original capital expended for utility development is the property taken for
public purposes the original investment should, therefore, constitute under the cnondemna-
tion theory the prima facie or actual condemnation value.
One could revel in details showing how illogical and inconsistent the Supreme 0.urt
has been in considering "fair value' for rate-making. Nevertheless, it has always pre-
served a basic view of purpose and kept "fair v'alue' clear of preventing either rate reduc-
tions or rate increases. It has never, moreover, taken earning power directly as the
measure of "fair value," although indirectly it has approved the capitalization of earning
power to some extent, as in the allowance for "going concern" value.
Any past vagaries, moreover, regarding the nature of "fair value" have disappeared
with the present Supreme Court. In the Hope Natural Gas Company case, Mr. Justice
Douglas states explicitly that "rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the
value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be antici-
pated." Hope Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Comm., 320 U. S. 591, 691
(1944). There is no longer any confusion to the effect that "fair value" is in any vay
predicated upon existing earning power. If the same term is still to be used, it signifies
merely the measure of allowable earning power as determined by the rate base and is n~t
to be confused with any concept of value which directly or indirectly depends on earning
power.
1944]
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class; and by adding these class costs the total reproduction cost of the
properties devoted to public service was determined.
The unit price calculation was a matter of successive estimates and
cumulative conjecture. It was intended to show the total cost of labor
and materials that would be incurred if the properties were to be con-
structed or installed at the time of the rate inquiry. Apart from various
fanciful assumptions as to the nonexistence of the properties and the
continuance of original conditions of construction and other hypothetical
matters, each unit price was based on estimates of quantities of different
kinds of labor required under assumed methods of construction at given
wages or salaries, plus allowance for supervision and construction over-
heads. Similar estimates had to be made of quantities of different kinds
of materials theoretically used, prices paid, charges for transportation and
handling, and costs of tooling and equipment.
When these compounded estimates and calculations had been assem-
bled and presented by "qualified" witnesses as an appraisal before a
regulatory body, all the imaginary items and steps involved were subject
to detailed cross-examination, usually by several parties. Often two or
more appraisals were made on behalf of the different participants, involv-
ing basic conflicts of interest. The depreciation study was likewise based
on estimates. Determination of the extent of depreciation that had ac-
crued required physical inspection of all the properties. Measurements
were not definite, and since the study was made on behalf of each partici-
pant, it was subject to meticulous direct and cross-examination.Inasmuch as the amounts wete arrived at throughout by judgment and
opinion, all valuation factors had to be presented by duly qualified
experts. Persons were selected not only for their knowledge and expe-
rience, but for their views in relation to the interest of the employing
party. On the side of the companies, highly specialized training was
common to build up maximum supportable reproduction cost figures and
minimum depreciation deductions. For "going concern" value extraordi-
nary fantasies were developed. The whole procedure was a travesty upon
sensible determination of relative private and public rights.3
Out of the welter of valuation testimony and exhibits presented in a
rate case, including actual cost along with reproduction cost and a variety
of other data, the regulatory commission was expected to reach somehow
the "fair value." Inevitably, the amount was inconclusive because it
13. Careful preparation, however, was practically limited to the company's side of a
rate case. On the public side, there was hardly ever sufficient planning and financial sup-
port for adequate preparation. Furthermore, the upper limits of valuation possibilities
for the company were much more elastic than the lower limits for the consumers. The
exhibits and testimony offered by the latter were never comparable in degree of devia-
tion to the fantastic figures supported for the companies by witnesses who were primarily
experts in the technique of rate base pyramiding.
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rested upon indefinite concepts and upon shifting and hypothetical figures.
If it was unsatisfactory to the company, the determination was subject
to review by the courts. This required more time and ex-pense, and condi-
tions often had changed so much when litigation was concluded that a
new round of inquiry was necessary to fix "reasonable rates." 14
This procedure naturally resulted in avoidance of rate cases by the
regulatory bodies. Systematic regulation was impossible, since commis-
sions did not have staffs adequate to do the requisite work. Consequently,
they tried for the most part to get such rate reductions as could be ob-
tained through negotiation. To a large extent, therefore, real rate con-
trol broke down because of the crushing difficulties of administration.
"Fair Value" Abandoned. It is not surprising, therefore, that there
has been for years an incessant struggle to discard the "fair value" obfus-
cation and replace it with a rate base which starts with actual cost and
can be maintained continuously through regular accounting procedure.
Led by Messrs. Justices Brandeis and Holmes in brilliant minority opin-
ions during the nineteen-twenties, this fight has been brought to a win-
ning conclusion in the present Supreme Court, largely under the aegis of
Messrs. Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy, although apparently no
member of the Court adheres to the reproduction cost requirement.
The final discard of the "reproduction cost" requirement was presaged
in 1942 by the Natufral Gas Pipeline Company case.la While this case
involved temporary rates fixed by the Federal Power Commission under
the administration of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, the determination of
the issues presented and the language used in the opinion by Chief jus-
tice Stone virtually decided that reproduction cost was no longer a requi-
site element of the rate base.
"The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service
of any single formula or combination of formulas. Agencies to whom
this legislative power has been delegated are free, within the ambit
of their statutory authority, to make the pragmatic adjustments which
may be called for by particular circumstances. Once a fair hearing
has been given, proper findings made and other statutory require-
14. Among the notorious cases in which the rate-making process was bloched for
many years is the Chicago Tclcphone case. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
292 U. S. 151 (1934). The Supreme Court in 1934, the second time the matter was before
the Court, finally wrote a definite fiis to the elaborate contentions urged by the com-
pany for over ten years, ordering large refunds to be paid to consumers. For a more com-
plete survey of the issues presented by the problem of determining "fair value," see BLNLs,
THnE Ecoxomcs OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1942), the latest and a highly com-
petent survey of the various aspects of utility regulation; BAuR, EFenCr[VE RE=G Tiw
OF PuBLIc UrnrMs (1925); BAUR AND GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATIO:. roF Pun-
rosan oF RATE CoNTrOL (1934) ; and BONBRIGUT, VALUATION oF PRoPT-T- (1937).
15. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
1944]
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ments satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear
showing that the limits of due process have been overstepped." 10
This position was further confirmed by the concurring opinion of Messrs.
Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Black. After reviewing the controversy
over reproduction cost, they concluded that courts cannot "concern them-
selves with any issues.as to the economic merits of a rate base," and that
the Federal Power Commission
is now freed from the compulsion of admitting evidence on
reproduction cost or of giving any weight to that element of 'fair
value.' The Commission may now adopt, if it chooses, prudent in-
vestment as a rate base-the base long advocated by Mr. Justice
Brandeis. And for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
the Southwestern Bell .Telephone Case, there could be no constitu-
tional objection if the Commission adhered to that formula and re-
jected all others." 17
Yet, despite the apparent clarity of these opinions, the casting out of re-
production cost as a required element of "fair value" could not be accept-
ed by those imbued with the old concept or those who stood to gain from
continued confusion.
The issue was, therefore, raised again by the Hope Natural Gas Coni-
pany in May, 1942, when it was ordered by the Federal Power Commis-
sion to reduce its future interstate rates by approximately $3,610,000 in
annual operating revenues. The order was predicated on a prudent invest-
ment rate base without any allowance for reproduction cost. Prudent
investment, as adopted by the Commission, consisted of the actual orig-
inal cost of the properties used in service less the required depreciation
reserve to provide for all factors of depletion and depreciation; it exclud-
ed, moreover, $17,000,000 of past well-drilling costs, which, in accord-
ance with earlier accounting standards, had been charged to operating
expenses."3 On petition for review, the order was set aside by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, one judge dissenting, chiefly because
of (1) the failure to allow for reproduction cost in the rate base, (2) the
rejection of the $17,000,000 of well-drilling costs, and (3) the deduction
of the required depreciation reserve as determined by the Commission."
16. Id. at 586.
17. Id. at 606.
18. Cleveland and Akron v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 44 P. V. R. (N.s.) 1 (1942).
19. In considering "fair value-reproduction cost," Judge Parker, who wrote the ina-
jority opinion in the Circuit Court, quoted extensively with approval from BAUER AND
GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PURPOSES OF RATE CONTROL (1934), in regard to
both reproduction cost and to the determination of depreciation. Hope Natural Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 134 F. (2d) 287, 293-94 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943). He over-
looked, however, the book's objective which explains the particular position taken on these
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These are the items that enter directly into rate base determination. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court, after a galaxy of briefs and oral argu-
ments, reversed the Circuit Court and sustained the Commission in an
opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas.
The decision, especially in view of the issues specifically raised, definite-
ly disposed of reproduction cost as a necessary rate base factor. The
company had contended for a net valuation of $66,000,000, and based its
claim on a $97,000,000 reproduction cost. The Commission's valuation
of $33,712,000 was predicated on an original cost of $51,957,000. The
reproduction cost issue was, therefore, determinative of the results, and
the Commission was sweepingly sustained by the following conclusive
disposition:
"We held in Federal Power Comnzission v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. . . . that the Commission was not bound to the use of any sin-
gle formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. Its
rate-making function, moreover, involves the making of 'pragmatic
adjustments.' . . . And when the Commission's order is challenged
in the courts, the question is whether that order 'viewed in its en-
tirety' meets the requirements of the Act. . . . Under the statutory
standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the meth-
od employed which is controlling. . . . It is not theory but the impact
of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under
questions. The book was published in 1934 and was predicated upon what then appeared
to be fixed legal requirements in the determination of "fair value." The objective was tW
bring about the displacement of the unclear and variable "fair value" standard by the
establishment of an exact accounting rate base. For that purpose it was proposed that
under comprehensive and definite statutory provisions the existing properties at the time
of the shift over should be appraised in compliance with prevailing "fair value" require-
ments both as to reproduction cost and depreciation deduction. After such initial deter-
mination for each company, the accounts were to be rewritten accordingly and not subject
to further revaluation, despite any changes in prices and costs or other conditions affecting
properties. All subsequent plant changes (additions, retirements, and further accruing
depreciation) would then be entered in the records as regular accounting procedure. See
pages 507-08 infra.
The purpose was, therefore, to establish a definite accounting rate base and still meet
the immediate necessities of "fair value." At the time, there was grave doubt among
legal circles whether even such an effort to escape the strangling effects of "fair value"
would pass the Supreme Court. The plan had been presented to the 1929 New York
Legislative Committee investigating the effectiveness of the state public service commis-
sion law and rejected by the majority of the Committee because of assumed unconstitu-
tionality. I Coianssiox ow RFvzsioN OF PUaLIC SERvICE COMsMSSions LAWs: Rro.-
AND HEAMNGS (1930) 17-21. It was espoused, however, by the minurity, id. at 51, and
embodied in the so-called Roosevelt public utility bills submitted to the legislature in 1930.
No such strain to escape judicial restraints is now necessary. An accounting rate base
can be established without an initial valuation giving effect to reproduction cost. Repro-
duction cost can be ignored without the circumvention presented in the Bauer-Gold boo!.
1944]
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the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that
result may contain infirmities is not then important. Moreover, the
Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact
that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which car-
ries a presumption of validity. And he who would upset the rate
order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a convinc-
ing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable
in its consequences." 20
This disposition not only does away with reproduction cost, but also frees
the Commission, or any regulatory body, from technical requirements
in fixing reasonable rates. The end result is controlling regardless of the
methods employed. No particular rate base provisions are imposed, pro-
vided that the rates as fixed are all-around "just and reasonable."
The Court also approved summarily the Commission's disregard of
the $17,000,000 well-drilling costs charged to past operating expenses
without discussing the technical issues raised by the company. It upheld
tacitly by absence of comment the Commission's depreciation deduction,
ignoring opposing theories that had been urged for approval.2 While
the case involved the administration of the Federal Natural Gas Act of
1938, the decision and the opinion apply as well to state commissions and
other utility regulatory bodies insofar as controlling statutes do not fix
different specific standards and procedures.
Rate control is left as a basic legislative function, and when it is as-
signed to a special body for administration, courts cannot interfere, except
where conclusive injustice has been perpetrated.
Although judicial review is not completely eliminated, anyone seeking
to upset the rate schedule as fixed "carries the heavy burden of making
a convincing showing that it is invalid because unjust and unreasonable
in its consequences." If in any instance review is sought and granted, the
court is now bound to disregard the methods and procedure by which the
rates have been fixed and to consider only the apparent reasonableness of
the resulting rates. For such consideration there is no technical yardstick,
but the showing of unreasonableness must be convincing. Mr. Justice
Douglas indicated that the Court must balance "the investor and consumer
interests," recognizing that "regulation does not insure that the business
shall produce net revenues," but that there is "a legitimate concern with
the financial integrity of the company," and that "it is important that there
20. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944).
21. The Court directly overruled, moreover, the holding in United Railways v. West,
280 U. S. 234 (1930), that the current depreciation allowance in rate-making must be
predicated on reproduction cost in harmony with the earlier rate base holdings. It recog-
nized the propriety of basing annual depreciation on cost. "By such a procedure the
utility is made whole and the integrity of its investment maintained. No more is required,"
Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 320 U. S. 591, 606 (1944).
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be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital
costs of the business," including "service on the debt and dividends on
the stock."
"By that standard the return to the equity owner should be com-
mensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as
to maintain its credit and to attract capital .. . The conditions
under which more or less might be allowed are not important here.
Nor is it important to this case to determine the various permissible
ways in which any rate base on which the return is computed might
be arrived at. For we are of the view that the end result in this case
cannot be condemned under the Act as unjust and unreasonable from
the investor or company viewpoint." -
The judicial criteria of invalidity are, then, left quite indefinite, pre-
sumably to preclude the imposition of formulae and the shackling of
regulation. Without specific measurements, the showing of the petition
for review must be conclusive that the rates are inadequate, not merely
injuring the investors unjustly, but preventing proper service to the pub-
lic. The task of future regulation is lodged practically in its entirety in
the commissions, and courts retain only the rigorously limited function
of preventing really unjust and destructive administrative action.?
A PUBLIC POLICY RATE BASE
Freed from judicial restrictions on rate base determination-at least
from" those imposed by the federal courts- 4-- commissions may now adopt
such rate bases as will be best suited to the objectives embodied sin regu-
latory statutes. They can devise the means according to the purposes.
The rest of this article will be devoted to the kind of rate base best quali-
fied to achieve the goals of regulation. The controlling standard is ad-
ministrability.
22. Id. at 603.
23. Since this article was written, the Supreme Court has approved an order of the
Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia authorizing the Washington Gas
Light Company to effect a rate increase equal to 1200,000 a year. Vinsun .,. Washington
Gas Light Co. and Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 12 U. S. L
\VrEEK 4256 (U. S. 1944). This increase opposed as inflationary by the Director of Eco-
nomic Stabilization and the Office of Price Administration, was approved by the Court
on the basis of the Commission's findings. Mr. Justice Douglas, howev'er, wrote a dissent-
ing opinion, joined by.Messrs. Justices Murphy and Black, objecting to the refusal to per-
mit the Economic Stabilization Director, legally a participant in the proceedings, to offer
in evidence alleged facts which would show that the'rejection of the rate increase wuuld
not create a hardship upon the company. Id. at 4259.
24. The possibility of state courts holding to "fair value-reproduction cost" re-
quirements are considered later in this article. See pages 512-13 infra.
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Establishment of a rate base which can be systematically administered
requires (1) the adoption of a precise concept, (2) exact determination
of initial amounts, and (3) continuous factual adjustments as changes
in the operating properties take place in order that accounts and records
may show definitely at any time the amount on which the company is
entitled to receive a reasonable return. In addition, the rate of return in
relation to the rate base should be determined continuously in order to
furnish the amount of return to be included in the fixing of rates.
"Prudent lizvestment." The concept "prudent investment" has been
widely recognized as embodying more successfully than other concepts
the criteria of a satisfactory public policy rate base3 By itself, however,
the term is not as precise as it might appear. It will mean here the orig-
inal cost of the properties used in public service, less the part of such
cost which is applicable to past use, leaving the balance as net prudent
investment devoted to present and future operation. The deduction is the
total existing depreciation due both to physical wear and decay and to
various functional causes, especially obsolescence. If proper plant and
depreciation accounting has been adhered to, the total cost of the plant
units, less the depreciation reserve, is equal, at any given time, to the in-
vestment actually made, the full amount having been preserved. But
if adequate provisions for depreciation have not been made directly or
indirectly, interest and dividends may have been paid upon the conse-
quent showing of corporate net income and the investment correspond-
ingly impaired. In such a case the original cost less the depreciation
as properly found constitutes the unimpaired prudent investment. The
idea of "prudent" signifies only the reasonableness of the various plant
expenditures from the standpoint of original foresight, not present hind-
sight. The rate base here advocated would be of the same type as that
approved-by the Supreme Court in the Hope Natural Gas case.
"Prudent investment" is viewed at times, especially by people who
would gain thereby, as consisting of the gross original cost of all the
plant units devoted to public use without deduction of past depreciation
due to physical and functional causes. The inapplicability of this gross
cost view appears clear if one considers that once a corporate investment
is made, it must subsequently be fully maintained or it will be impaired
or dissipated. Such full maintenance consists of ordinary repairs plus
proper provisions for depreciation as it accrues, both charged regularly
to operating expenses, which are in turn included in rates paid by con-
sumers. If the total original cost of plant were included in the rate base,
25. The term public policy rate base suggests the contrast to commercial value and
indicates criteria for specific adoption. See Bauer, Public Policy Concept of Valuation
for Purposes of Public Utility Rate Control (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 403. The essential cri-
,teria are presented and discussed in BAUER AND GoLD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 363-465.
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the company would get a return not only on its own actual or unimpaired
investment, but also on the amount of consumer contribution provided
in the rates for the purpose of conserving the corporate investment. And
even if depreciation were deducted, the company might still get a return
on consumer contributions if its own accounting were taken as conclusive.
This would be true directly if adequate depreciation accruals had not been
made. In that case, the stated surplus as presented in the balance sheet
would reflect depreciation rather than actual surplus. If the showing of
surplus were not sufficient to provide for reserve adjustments, there would
have been plain impairment of capital or investment through past inter-
est and dividend payments.
Prudent investment should, therefore, consist initially of the total
original cost of plant in service less properly determined depreciation.
The amount thus established will subsequently be subject to the plant and
depreciation charges regularly entered into the corporate accounts under
appropriate accounting standards.
If this concept of prudent investment is adopted, determination of the
initial amounts should follow. First, the original cost of all the prop-
erties in service must be ascertained. Secondly, the part of the original
cost applicable to past depreciation should be determined. Thirdly, the
property accounts and the depreciation reserve should be rewritten in
accordance with the factual findings. The prudent investment rate base
would be the original cost less the depreciation as found and embodied
in the accounts. Initial establishment of original cost and depreciation is
a sizable though indispensable task if a definite rate base is to be estab-
lished and maintained for systematic regulation.
Prudent investment, as technically defined above, applies only to the
physical plant, or so-called "fixed capital," devoted to public service. In
addition, however, it includes an amount for "working capital," consist-
ing of the cash, materials, accounts receivable, and other current assets
held by a company to facilitate public service, less corresponding current
liabilities and operating reserves other than depreciation. Since the
amount involved is usually of minor importance, it has caused little diffi-
culty and will not be further considered in the present survey, but it
should be definitely provided for in the readjustment of accounts neces-
sary for the adoption of the prudent investment rate base.
Original Cost Reclassification. To a large extent, the original cost of
the properties in service has already been determined. The Federal Power
Commission has required all electric companies under its jurisdiction to
reclassify their plant accounts so as to show the original cost of each class
of property in service. The procedure has been: first, to require each
company to make its own readjustments and reclassification; secondly, for
the Commission's staff to make a survey and report; and, finally, for the
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Commission to issue formal findings and an order of reclassification. As
a result, previous write-ups and other unwarranted charges have been
eliminated leaving only the reasonable original cost under each account.
To date, eliminations have averaged approximately twenty-five per cent of
the original cost as established. When the total reclassification is complet-
ed, the bulk of the electric properties of the country will be entered in the
accounts at original cost as officially found and ordered by the Commis-
sion. The legal power to require reclassification was recently confirmed
by the Supreme Court. 26
Besides the Federal Power Commission, several state agencies are also
requiring original cost reclassification. In either case the original costs
are determined for each class of property in service and are taken from
past purchase or construction records or are reasonably estimated where
adequate records are not available. Although the making of these deter-
minations is a great task, it needs to be done only once for the permanent
clearing up of the past rate base muddle. The process should be extended
to all utility properties subject to public rate control.
Once plant accounts have been rewritten, all subsequent plant changes
will be entered in the accounts at original cost. Additions, improvements,
extensions, and replacements will be added or charged to the appropriate
accounts; and all retirements from service will be deducted or credited.
At any given time, therefore, the balance.of any account will show the
original cost of the particular kind of plant, and the total of all the bal-
ances will give the original cost of all the properties in service.
Such regular and definite plant accounting will eliminate from rate base
computation the indefiniteness, estimates, and conjectures of reproduction
cost findings. While initial estimates of original cost are, to a consider-
able extent, unavoidable in the reclassification, they are based on definite
concepts and preclude merely speculative figures. And, it should be
.stressed, there will be no subsequent revaluations. Once reclassification
has been completed for any company, the costs entered in the plant ac-
counts will thereafter remain unchanged except as retirements and addi-
tions take place. Throughout, there will be exact amounts in the account-
ing. While the current changes should be subject to commission scrutiny
to preclude impropdr entries, once approved they will stand as fact and
will be controlling in regulatory procedure. There will be no further con-
flicts of interest, disputes as to amounts, delays in ascertainment, or other
impediments to regular and systematic administration.
Depreciation: Determination and Accounting. In addition to the orig-
inal cost of plant in service, the proper deduction for past depreciation
must be ascertained in order to establish the net plant cost or investment




devoted to present and future service. Determination of past depreciation
involves not only factual ascertainment, but also adoption of a precise
concept. As to the latter, at least four distinct views of the depreciation
deduction have been urged before commissions and courts. The first, the
so-called "observed" depreciation, would provide only for such physical
wear and decay as can be readily seen and would consist chiefly of the
cost of placing the properties into good operating condition. Another
view, full "physical" depreciation, consists merely of past wear and de-
cay. A third is the depreciation reserve shown by the accounts under past
accounting and financial policies. Finally, there is the concept of full de-
preciation due to both physical and functional causes, particularly obso-
lescence.
This last concept of full depreciation was applied in the Hope Natural
Gas case and was approved by the Supreme Court.2 7 Representing the
decrease in total original service life of the property units due to physical
and functional causes, it involves ascertainment of the percentage of total
expired serviceability, which is then applied to the original cost. Deter-
minations are made separately for each class of property or property
units and are entered in the depreciation reserve, which is, in turn, de-
ducted from the original cost to show the net plant investment or pru-
dent investment rate base.
Establishment of the initial depreciation requires inspection and testing
of physical wear and decay and also calculation of functional decline.
Physical depreciation is due to the deterioration of existing plant units
27. In the Hope case the Federal Power Commission followed the policy of deducting
the required depreciation reserve from original cost, as it had in previous cases. In those
cases, however, the actual reserves had been less than the required amounts found by the
Commission. In the Hope case the total actual reserve resulting from past charges to
operating expenses for depreciation greatly exceeded the required reserve. Commissioner
John IV. Scott maintained in a separate opinion that where an excess reserve had been
accrued through past charges to operating expenses, the full amount should be deducted
from original cost for determination of the rate base. He pointed out that the effect of
the excessive annual depreciation charges to operating expenses upon the relative investor-
consumer investments was the same as past charges to operating expenses for well-drill-
ing which were not included in the rate base, although, according to proper accounting
practice, they should have been considered originally as capital expenditures. Such charges
resulted in showing excessive annual cost of operation, in understating the company's
net earnings, and in building up the properties out of rates paid by consumers. Cleveland
and Akron v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 44 P. U. R. (.s.) 1, 39 (1942). Commissioner
Scott's analysis deserves consideration in the initial ascertainment of the depreciation
deduction. There is no incongruity of policy between deducting the required reserve where
past annual depreciation charges have been inadequate and the company has made cor-
respondingly greater distribution of net earnings, and deducting the full actual reserve
accruals where excess annual charges have been made and the company has thus covered
up or understated its net earnings. The issue, however, does not have serious regulatory
importance. Actual reserves are usually inadequate, and the required reserve deduction
generally exceeds past depreciation accruals.
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and can, to a large extent, be determined by inspection and measurement.
But functional depreciation, either obsolescence due to technological ad-
vances or inadequacy caused by increasing service requirements, is not
due to conditions embodied within the actual plant units, but rather to
the greater efficiency or other superiority of available substitutes. As
better suited units become available, the ones in service depreciate accord-
ingly by loss in total remaining serviceability. Determination of func-
tional decline, therefore, depends upon service comparisons of actual with
available plant units, considering relative operating efficiency, required
repairs, depreciation, and other expenses incurred in regular operation.
The superiority of available substitutes is offset by the depreciation of the
actual units, for the return on the depreciated sum plus the greater rela-
tive operating expenses of the actual units equals, in relation to a given
volume of regular production or service output, the return on the full
cost of the available substitutes plus their lower operating expenses. The
depreciation deduction thus produces capital equivalence between the
existing units and the full capital cost of the available. Such determina-
tions involve considerable factual uncertainties and rough approxima-
tions, but they must be made if a definite accounting rate base is to be
provided for the future needs of workable regulation.
The task of establishing the initial depreciation of the properties in
service has scarcely been touched. Since the Federal Power Commission
has led in fixing the standards for comprehensive original cost reclassifi-
cation, it may be urged to push similarly depreciation findings. It has
already established such amounts for a considerable number of natural
gas companies and will doubtless proceed likewise with electric compaffies
when conditions justify or permit. State commissions should join active-
ly, if they desire a definite and administrable rate base.
Accounting Rate Base. Once the initial determinations have been made
both as to original cost and depreciation and the plant accounts and de-
preciation reserve have been rewritten or adjusted to show the established
amounts, subsequent changes both in plant and depreciation can be readily
entered into the accounts. The procedure for plant additions and retire-
ments has already been outlined.23  For depreciation, the current amount
due to both physical and functional causes is charged to, or included in,
operating expenses as a cost of service, and, at the same time, it is added
or credited to the depreciation reserve, which thus adds cumulatively for
every accounting period the currently developing depreciation. When
property units are retired and deducted from, or credited to, the proper
plant accounts at original cost, the amount less salvage is also deducted
from, or charged to, the depreciation reserve.
,28. See page 508 supra.
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With such definite accounting, the reserve shows at any time the total
amount of accrued depreciation for all the properties in service, while
the plant accounts present the total original cost. The deduction of the
reserve from the total original cost gives the net plant cost or rate base.
This is a definite figure, promptly shown by reference to the accounts,
and it furnishes the basic standards for systematic and effective adminis-
tration in rate-making or other matters involving private and public inter-
ests.29
Apart from the rate base, there have been no greatly troublesome fac-
tors in the work of regulation. The proper rate of return, as 'well as
operating expenses and taxes, can be readily provided for without serious
difficulties, although scrutiny is necessary to assure proper determination
of cost. Commissions can now establish an exact accounting rate base for
every company and be free from the confusions and hindrances of past
rate case procedure. With exact accounting provisions, they can readily
scrutinize the results of operation periodically, at least once a year, and
can then order rate adjustments promptly in accordance with definite
standards and exact showing of facts. Rates can thereby be reduced
readily as justified or raised as actually needed with equal and effective
protection for both consumers and investors. Rate control may become
a matter of regular administration-not litigation or weak negotiation-
constantly directed towards public objectives.
Special Legislation. Every public rate-making body should adopt
promptly the definite rate base now available and establish a factual sys-
tem of regulation that can be systematically administered. But while such
standards can be immediately attained, in practically all instances their
effective application will require special legislation and adequate finan-
cial support.
The glaring defect of practically all past regulatory legislation has been
its general character, its lack of definite prescription of objectives and
means. In providing for rate control, statutes have generally merely
authorized or required commissions to fix reasonable rates and to prevent
discriminatory charges, but otherwise have provided no goals or fixed
standards and procedure. With such loose statutory enactments, commis-
29. The official procedure widely adopted by commissiuns in respect tu current ac-
counting for changes in plant accounts and in depreciation reserve is in harmony with
the proposals outlined in this article. The writer agrees entirely with the FPC accounting
classifications and in the main with the recent recommendations of the special depreciation
committee of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners. Pr,.cGCE-
L"XGS OF THE; 1943 WJAR CONFEnENCE OF THE NxroNAL ASso0LOwi:; Cr RuL. ,AD AND
UmirrrEs Comn-ssio'xEs (1943) 33. Specific and detailed accounting for current changes
in plant and accrued depreciation still does not provide, however, satisfactory data fur the
calculation of a prudent investment rate base, unless proper initial adjustments are also
made in regard to present existing plant and depreciation. See pages 507-10 mipra.
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sions have had to improvise for themselves, and, therefore, have almost
inevitably encountered judicial determinations and limitations controlling
their work.
While the Supreme Court now has, to a large extent, eliminated judi-
cial restrictions and requirements, leaving the task of regulation almost
in full to the commissions, positive and clarifying amendments to pres-
ent regulatory statutes would, in most states, greatly facilitate this task.
The amendments could make mandatory the establishment and main-
tenance of a prudent investment rate base, prescribe generally the steps
in its 9pplication, and fix other objectives and means for the protection
and advancement of the public interest together with exact safeguarding
of private investments devoted to public use. Legislative directives might
also require creation of special reserves and other arrangements for sys-
tematic and full protection of consumers and investors. To facilitate
administration on an exact basis, the relative rights of consumers and
investors could be defined precisely and regularly safeguarded. If the
objectives of regulation were stated as explicitly as possible, the area
of conflicting interests would be greatly narrowed, if not completely
removed.
State Law. In some states, however, the "fair value-reproduction cost"
factors may be invoked as a matter of state rather than federal law. And
in the unscrambling of federal from state law there may be considerable
c6nfusion since judicial directives in many state cases as to provisions
for "fair value" were probably predicated upon federal standards which
had to be followed as Constitutional prescriptions.
Even as to state statutes, moreover, basic federal and state law may con-
verge. Past regulatory statutes were naturally based upon the long-stand-
ing federal "fair value" rule. In some instances, they embodied much of
the language of the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames. 0 Consequently,
statutes containing traditional "fair value" provisions will require close
scrutiny to determine whether they were merely made harmonious with
the old notion of federal law or were in themselves intended to fix definite
state policy. Utility counsel will doubtless argue that the statutes and
case law of the state retain the old "fair value" requirements and, there-'
fore, preclude establishment of prudent investment as a rate base. Any
such existing state legal impediments to the adoption of the prudent in-
vestment rate base and of other procedures for systematic administration
of rate-making, should be removed through appropriate legislation or, if
necessary, by constitutional amendment. A definite system of control
should be provided. If any state regulation continues to flounder as in
the past, the fault rests with the commission or with restrictive features
30. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
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within the state law. The Supreme Court has eliminated the possibilities
of unreasonable interference so far as the incidence of the federal law is
concerned.3'
31. On the basic question whether reproduction cost must be given factual considera-
tion in the rate base, there was unanimity among the eight judges in the Hope case. Mr.
Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Mr. Justice Reed, however, disagreed with the view "that it makes no difference how
the Commission reached a rate base so long as the result is fair and reasonable." See Mr.
justice Reed, dissenting in Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S.
591, 620, 623 (1944). He considered the FPC disallowance of a $17,00,00 outlay for
well-drilling "a major error," believing that it should be included along with other plant
costs in the determination of the rate base. Id. at 624.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected to the Commission's action because "the range of its
vision was too narrow." See 'Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, ibid. He agreed with
the analysis presented by Mr. Justice Jackson, which deserves future consideration in the
determination of regulatory objectives.
The Jackson opinion is apparently unique in the annals of court decisions and opinions,
because Mr. Justice Jackson considers the basic matters of broad public interest as well as
direct legal issues. See Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, id. at 628. Wile Mr. Justice Jack-
son agrees that the theory of "fair value-reproduction cost" should be overruled, he never-
theless feels that the case should have been remanded to the Commission for reconsidera-
tion in the light of the purposes involved in the Natural Gas Act of 193S and of the basic
economic and social factors encountered in the natural gas industry. He conceives the
basic purpose of the Act to be the conservation of the natural gas supply for maximum
usefulness to the public. M1aximum usefulness consists in residential as against commer-
cial and industrial consumption. He points out that the rates which are to be determined
in the light of the public interest are specifically required to be non-discriminatory. The
Hope case started in part on the grounds of discrimination between consumers and between
classes of service. In its disposition of the case, however, the Commission ordered a flat
percentage reduction in rates regardless of factors of conservation and discrimination.
Mr. Justice Jacskon points to the comparatively much higher rates for residential than for
commercial and industrial use and states that the public interest "requires that the great
volume of gas now being put to uneconomic industrial use should either be saved for its
more important future domestic use or the present domestic user should have the full
benefit of its exchange value in reducing his present rates." Id. at 659.
There may be a question, however, as to what the controlling purpose of the Act
really was or how it was to be attained. Presumably, moreover, the Commission had con-
sidered the purposes of the Act and had decided that the reduction ordered was in con-
formity with such purposes. The issue of general nonconformity was not before the Court.
Moreover, if Mr. Justice Jackson's general position were to be adopted as controlling, util-
ity cases would come back to the courts for consideration of various public aspects. Thus
the sigual accomplishment of the Hope decision, which was to leave the job of regulation
with the commissions except under the clear circumstances of unjust orders, would be
nullified.
Perhaps the sensible course would be to make the regulatory statutes as explicit as
possible in regard to purposes and means and then leave the work of regulation to admin-
istrative agencies, subject primarily to executive rather than judicial control. Yet, the
function of ultimate judicial review can hardly be discarded entirely.
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